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
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES OF COLLEGE TEACHING

In the Preparation of Teachers

by

Robert Ulich

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THE EDWARD W. HAZEN FOUNDATION
400 Prospect Street
New Haven 11, Connecticut

PREFACE TO THE SERIES OF ESSAYS

Three years ago Professor George F. Thomas of Princeton University, in a letter to The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, urged the need for careful studies by natural scientists, social scientists, and humanistic scholars concerning the religious issues, implications and responsibilities involved in the teaching of their respective disciplines. This pamphlet is part of a series instituted by The Edward W. Hazen Foundation for the purpose of carrying Professor Thomas' suggestion into the sphere of fruitful inquiry and discussion. Under the sponsorship of The Foundation, the undersigned committee has enlisted the aid of distinguished scholars deeply interested in the relations between religion and higher education. Each of these scholars will discuss the problem in its specific pertinence to his own field of learning, his own conception of his intellectual and spiritual responsibilities to his students, to the institution which he serves, and to society in general. He will address himself primarily to fellow-teachers in his field, secondarily to students and to interested members of the educated public.

The committee responsible for the survey wishes to steer a course between two opposite dangers; that of a theological vagueness which would produce nothing but noncommittal generalities, and that of a dogmatism which would alienate all but a small number of readers. The views of the authors of these essays may vary from liberal to orthodox interpretations of religion. Throughout this diversity, however, runs a common denominator which is shared by the authors and by the members of the committee. Religion is not nature-worship, or man-worship, or science-worship. It is not the totality of human value. Although it is metaphysical, ethical, and humanitarian, it cannot be equated with metaphysics, or ethics, or humanitarianism. Religion is man's quest for communion with an ultimate spiritual reality completely independent of human desires and imaginings. Religion apprehends this Absolute Reality and Value in faith, and seeks to give concrete embodiment to the ineffable in creed, cult, and conduct. The creative power of the universe is not an intellectual abstraction but an objective entity, a Divine Being. Although God infinitely transcends our human nature and understanding, He most potently reveals Himself to those who conceive of Him in personal terms. Thus symbolized, He becomes

for us not merely Cosmic Mind, but Creator, Judge and Redeemer of mankind.

Within this broad but positive consensus the authors of these essays will exercise complete freedom in expressing their personal views. As regards the relevance of religion for higher education there is also general agreement among those associated with this survey. The cleavage which divides intellectual from spiritual life is probably the most ominous defect of modern civilization. "High religion and intellectual enterprise belong together," says Professor Robert L. Calhoun. "Each gains from close association with the other. The two in conjunction, but neither one by itself, can move with hope toward more effective conquest of the chaos that again and again threatens to engulf human living. That way lies whatever chance we may have for a more humane world."

In his essay *Colleges, Faculties and Religion*, appraising consultations with more than fifty faculties, Professor Albert C. Outler reports that "Education is by way of being reformed with little or no regard for the possible contribution of religion to its reformation. For a very tangled skein of reasons, it has come to pass that, in the name of tolerance and the democratic spirit, American educators (whatever their private beliefs and convictions) have in fact suppressed the consideration of the problems of the religious interpretation of reality and human existence in the educational process." He sees, however, evidence that religion will become increasingly influential in American higher education if it can receive "a fair hearing in the open forum of American academic discussion Where this is done, there is usually a vigorous and generally favorable reaction from both faculty and students."

To obtain such a "fair hearing" from a large academic audience is the purpose of these essays. Even in these days of "general education," however, the modern scholar remains a specialist. He is likely to be less interested in the general problem of the place of religion in higher education than in the specific problem of how religion pertains to the teaching of his particular subject. This more specialized aspect of the question deserves more careful investigation than it has hitherto received. At present, therefore, these essays are being published as separate pamphlets so that each may appeal directly to those concerned with the discipline which it discusses.

It is hoped, however, that the project may prove fruitful enough to justify later publication in a single volume or perhaps in three shorter books devoted respectively to the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

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PRINTED IN U. S. A.

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN THE PREPARATION OF TEACHERS

ROBERT ULLICH

Any adequate preparation of teachers includes both general or liberal education and specialized training. Consequently the religious dimension in the educational experience of prospective teachers is dealt with in large part in other essays in this series. But it is equally important to understand the religious perspectives in the ideals and motivation of *democracy* of which teachers are trustees in a special sense. It is this theme with which the present essay is primarily concerned. The argument is presented in four parts: 1. The current cultural and educational situation; 2. The religious attitude; 3. The meaning and teaching of democracy; 4. The responsibilities of those who prepare teachers for their vocation.

I. THE CURRENT EDUCATIONAL SITUATION

Three aspects of the present cultural situation as it relates to education may be illustrated by reports of three recent conversations.

1. *The Absence of Imagination and Insight.* There came to the office of one of my philosophically minded colleagues a publisher to report that his company was planning a new series of educational textbooks. My friend replied that we already have too many textbooks in education and related fields, though few really good ones.

"What would you recommend instead?" asked the agent.

My colleague's answer was, "I would recommend a series of monographs on the great educational pioneers who through a life of sacrifice and profound thought have given expression and motivation to the cultural aspirations of mankind and prepared our minds for the idea that every human person has the right to develop his productive qualities to the best of his ability. We have many books on great statesmen, artists, and philosophers, but in the Anglo-Saxon countries we have no penetrating monographs of men such as Comenius, Pestalozzi, and Froebel. Could not our students derive lasting inspiration from communication with these leaders of mankind?"

"But," so the agent responded, "who would buy such books? They would not fit into the typical course work. Nor would the public read them. Ask around among the professors of your university whether they would buy a book on Comenius. Most of them would hardly know the name."

My friend had to admit it, though—according to his opinion—the memory of a great man, forgotten by the public, had often been revived by a well written book. While they were talking I, though listening with enthusiasm, became doubtful about the suggestion. Whom, despite the large number of our universities, could one recommend for such treatises in the interpretation of our educational history? Only a few, already too busy to assume new obligations. The younger men and women might be little interested, and still less prepared for carrying through this kind of study. In our high schools and colleges they have not been trained in the necessary contemplative attitude, the enduring patience, and the knowledge of languages. When they grow older and realize what they have missed, it is usually too late.

Actually, we move in a vicious circle. Especially in our education departments, we have been busy for decades with technical and methodological questions, the importance of which has often been exaggerated to the degree of boredom. But the sources from which a teacher could receive stimulation that would repay him for his hard work have rarely been opened up.

This is not the fault of education alone. Something similar is going on everywhere, as if imagination and inspiration were forgotten values. Is it because we think they might destroy our scholarly objectivity? Are we perhaps assuming that objectivity is something other than a constant desire for depth and truth, or that this desire can be maintained without enthusiasm? Or does the reason lie still deeper, namely that in our academic world we have lost the courage of conviction from which alone inspiration can come? Have liberalism and democracy of which we and our students hear every day become just a "way" without a goal? Is an enemy or a cold war necessary to remind us of something besides the priority of politics, something that we need to renew and defend constantly? Or are there still sources which feed our souls from

within, even as they nourished the souls of all great men who have built the structure of human civilization?

2. *Inadequacy of the Concept "Social Engineering."* At a luncheon I happened to be seated beside the representative of one of our important educational agencies. He shared with me his hope that the social sciences would soon initiate a new historical epoch by applying the same effective techniques in relation to man that the natural sciences apply in relation to nature. I hesitated to disagree, for in a time of general disillusion one likes to hear a hopeful voice. Furthermore, to a degree I share the expectation that the extension of the experimental method into the field of human relations may help us understand ourselves and our society better. Yet, I could not refrain from expressing my regret that there had come about an almost complete separation between the new social sciences and the older humanities, especially history and philosophy.

"Do you mean to say," he asked, "that education, the social sciences, and the humanities belong together, with history and philosophy representing the 'older,' and education and the social sciences the 'new' humanities?"

This was about my answer. "There are now just as deep, and perhaps deeper revolutions going on in the 'older' field of philosophy than in the 'new' sciences about man and his society. But in that they all have to do with man, or *homo*, they could be placed under the category of the humanities and learn from each other."

"I doubt it," the academic statesman gave me to understand. "We need exact scientific methods. There is no need for educating historians who look into the past, and philosophers who look into the transcendental. We have to train scientists in human relations, or, if I may use a more accurate term, we have to educate leaders and engineers in the field of human conditioning. After all, social values are nothing but the results of conditioning. In older times this conditioning was done amateurishly, perhaps even unconsciously. Today, we have to do it scientifically."

"Concerning 'leaders' and 'engineers' in human 'conditioning' I am apparently allergic," I answered my neighbor. "I bumped into such people in Europe, or more accurately, they bumped into me;

otherwise I would not be here in the U. S. A. I personally refuse to be 'engineered' and to be treated like a piece of iron or a machine in a plant. In normal civilian life I even refuse to be treated like a soldier in a fighting army. I still have certain convictions about human freedom and its final goals. The vocabulary of the German Nazis was borrowed largely from the field of engineering—'gleichschalten.' Even in peace, Hitler called every citizen a soldier, and that was the end of Germany. Are you so certain that in our country the apparently inevitable progress in planning will always stop before it challenges the natural rights of man as proclaimed in the Constitution?"

My neighbor smiled. "Don't you see the difference? The Nazis conditioned people for the Hitler State, but we condition them for the Constitution."

But in "conditioning" men for the Constitution, will we not lose its spirit?

3. *The Fading of an Interest in Reality.* The other day I spoke with two research fellows who viewed mankind with the trained eyes of the psychologist and psychiatrist. We talked about education which for them was largely related to such concepts as "id, ego, and superego," "identification," "latency period," "aggression," "frustration," and "learning as tension release."

I listened with interest to their conversation, especially since one of the men was a Freudian, and the other a strictly experimental psychologist. There was much in their conversation with which I agreed, though they mostly disagreed. After a while I asked:

"Are these conceptual schemes, which you use to describe certain functions in man's behavior, adequate representations of man's driving motives, of the world that he enjoys and that he hates, that moves him to act, and that he would like to transmit to his children? I do not mean to blame you, for all of us who are engaged in scholarly rationalization, perhaps most of all the theologians, do the same thing. Theoretical concepts and their relationships are the means by which the scholar must try to order and understand the world. His quantitative and qualitative abstractions are wonderful instruments to deal with the regularities and laws of matter, but when applied to the overwhelming wealth of human reality, do they not miss its essence? Indeed, they are more

apt to do so the farther they progress on the road of analysis. Is there not something tragic in any scholar's endeavor, as in any life that moves primarily on the level of abstraction? Thought is reflection of reality, but reflection is not reality itself. This is an antinomy we cannot change and under the shadow of which we have to live. But should we not be aware of it?"

The answer I received was as follows:

"Of course, we use only symbols and do not know in what relation they may stand to reality, whatever reality may be. But does anybody 'truly experience' the Copernican theory? If he did, he would go insane. Yet, it explains our cosmos better than the older geocentric theory which sprang from man's naïve and immediate experience. Why should not the same hold true with the theories concerning the human mind, however abstract they may seem to the naïve listener?"

"But there is a difference," I objected. "Scientific theories about matter say something measurable about a world which we suppose to be causally determined, about a world in which there is no freedom, no moral decision, no delight and no despair in the human sense of the word. Man does not live in this world alone, and the more he is man, the more he frees himself from it. Of course, science has changed our external life. In this respect, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century has done more than the whole Renaissance with its art and its religious and political revolutions. Yet, whereas modern science has displaced Aristotle's theories about physics, it has not displaced his *Ethics*, or Plato's *Symposium*, or the Sermon on the Mount. In other words, in spite of all its technical power and all the wonderful revelations about man's physical conditions, natural science has not essentially modified man's picture of his moral self.

"Apparently, man has always known that he is in a certain *immediate* relation to the ground of life which reaches deeper than all science. Perhaps, if the objects of nature from the sun down to the smallest leaf of grass could speak to us in intellectual language, they also would tell us that the laws of Newton and Einstein are admirable descriptions of nature's behavior, but just descriptions rather than complete explanations of the creative power of the universe.

"Nearest to this power comes the intuitive insight of the religious prophet, of the great artist, perhaps also of the philosopher if he dares to be a kind of rational poet such as Plato recording Socrates' conversation with Diotima about the nature of Love.

"Thus, whenever we academic people speak of man and to man in the derivative language of the scientific investigator, we must know that we move only on the periphery of human existence. We may be farther away from its center than the genius with his profound intuition or the so-called common man. For in spite of all contrasts, both of these men rely on their immediate experience in the great adventure of an active and striving life, and if they need some explanation and contemplation, they rely on the great intuitive revelations of human wisdom and experience more than on analytical discourse. But when decade after decade an increasing number of erudite men with the self-assumed authority of 'exact' investigators tell the common man that the great religious and humane tradition would be better *replaced*, rather than *enriched*, by science, then this common man—to whom we all belong—may finally believe it. He may come to feel very learned and enlightened, but at the same time he may lose contact with that part of life and thought which he needs for sympathetic and courageous living: faith, hope, charity. For all these values do not come from description and analysis. And—naturally enough—the greater the loss in basic and directive beliefs, which spring from our own creativeness, the more we become ripe for control from outside, for control by government, propaganda, and 'social engineers'.

"This, then, will be the end of human freedom. For freedom and its political derivative, liberty, represent aspects of experience which do not belong in the exact scientist's dictionary. How could they? Yet, on them is built our civilization. Even the communists tell their people that a new freedom is waiting for all men. But in the U. S. A., in the land of 'democracy,' some of our scientists, philosophers, and psychologists tell their disciples that the word freedom has no real 'meaning.' Furthermore, that freedom cannot be 'measured'."

My two friends looked at me with suspicion. "In other words, you do not talk science, but you talk religion. Do you want us to

become preachers of sin, salvation, the Holy Trinity and eternal hell-fire? Whence do all the psychopathic guilt feelings of our patients come but from so-called religious education?"

"I might ask you," I replied, "how many people get stranded not because they have been harmed by religion, but because they have never lived in it. But you have misunderstood me, which was probably my fault. I am not against scholarly inquiry into the nature of man and his society, even if it may destroy cherished beliefs. The true and the good life, I am convinced, must be one and the same. And like you I loathe the confusion between religion, superstition, sentimentality, and the fear of new discoveries which makes thinking men suspicious of our churches. Since true religion does not live by science, it cannot be afraid of it. Rather it will be appreciative of its results. But man has the right to protest against partiality which claims totality, as is often the case with modern science.

"Are not most of us who are engaged in scholarly pursuits in such a phobia of anything not describable in scientific terms or deferrable to sensory experience that we may even misjudge the ultimate character of the physical world? For all that exists exists not on itself alone, but reaches into a uniting dimension which we have not the right to deny merely because we are unable to explain it. Thus, if we take our incomplete thinking for the whole of life, we may not even be good scientists; but certainly we are not good humanists, or good guides of our youth. Frankly, I am sometimes afraid we are misleaders of mankind."

"In other words," my psychological colleagues concluded, "you recommend that we go home and commit suicide."

"No, but I recommend that we stop allowing our students who later may have educational responsibilities as teachers, administrators, psychologists, and counsellors, to go out into the world with a heap of scholarly knowledge, and with less than a minimum of insight into the great spiritual wisdom of the human race. If the young men and women who enter these careers had lived a life full of activity, had reached into the depths of human gladness and human misery, perhaps they could be exposed to a merely scientific training without damage to themselves and other people. They would take it *cum grano salis*. But most of them have not.

They have gone through school and college, and perhaps worked for a master's or doctor's degree. Thus they are learned, but they may be far from educated. Should we entrust to them our youth, our society, the people who need courage and guidance with regard to the aims of life and not only with respect to its techniques?"

II. THE RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE

Now, in one respect my two interlocutors were right. In a sense, I was really talking about the "religious" as different from the "scientific" or even the "scholarly" attitude toward life, though I consider true science and true religion not as enemies but friends trying to climb the same summit from different starting points.

No attempt will be made here to define "religion" or "religious." Every sect and denomination will give a different answer, and we are not concerned here with the historical phenomena of the splitting of the perennial religious experience of a man in its different historical forms, however important they may be. Rather we are referring to certain features which, so we suppose, are somewhat similar in highly developed religious attitudes, though we admit that these attitudes cannot be neatly separated from their historical and sociological settings, their cults, and their expressed beliefs. There always exists an interaction between basic human desires, the attitudes they create, and the forms and institutions within and through which they express themselves.

By its very nature, such a description of basic attitudes under the title of religion exposes one to the reproach of vagueness. Orthodox theologians of all creeds, when speaking to and for their faithful, would even consider it heretical; an expression of opinion in which most men with a sense for a deeper dimension of life could somehow agree and which, for this very reason, would be worthless before their God. This agreement among men of sincere conviction is highly desirable, even though it bears no immediate reference to Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism or any other special creed.

The religious attitude of man presupposes a pervading sentiment of highly complex character. From a strictly logical point of view it seems to be paradoxical. For the human mind, so far as it is discriminating and analytical, conceptual and syntactic, can

always refer only to a limited and definable number of objects. In distinction, the religious sentiment—though being within man's span of experience, otherwise it would not exist—points at the same time beyond immediate sense perception. It is immanent in sense experience, but it moves out of the limited range of sensuousness. Though constantly appearing in the concreteness of life and nature it is meta-physical. It envisages an embracing and enveloping power, one which opens the soul for the entering of the Infinite.

The religious sentiment provides us with a sense of an abiding and lawful Order; at the same time this Order realizes itself to the human mind only in continual change and motion. It is felt with the might of utter reality, yet it can be expressed only in symbols. It can be apprehended in its strength and depth by the simple and humble, yet, the most educated mind breaks down in the attempt to explain it in its completeness. Nor will we receive much help from the usual distinction between the "natural" as the secular sphere, and the "supernatural" as the abode of the Spirit. One deprives nature of its lawfulness, beauty and dignity if one considers it mere "matter," separate from spirit. And one deprives spirit of its vitality, form, and fullness if one tries to lift it away from cosmic life into a de-substantiated *a priori*. If nature were without some inner order—which is within, but at the same time something different from, mere matter—it would be chaos. If spirit were without, or outside nature, it could not operate. What we call nature, and what we call spirit, are perhaps but two aspects by which one and the same wonder reflects upon the human mind, the wonder of continual creation. Therefore all such terms as dualism, monism, pantheism, etc., may be useful for clarifying standpoints and contrasts of opinion, but the moment they are taken as explanations of Reality, they become misleading concepts of presumptuous minds. The dualist encounters difficulty in explaining the relationship between mind and body, while the monist may arrive at a pantheism without a hierarchy of good and evil. Before the grandiose dialectic of the universe human language and its abstractions can never give the final answer. Whatever name we give to this Essence, whether we call it Knowing, Love, Creation, whether we conceive of it as Mind, Power or Person, how unsatisfactory are all such appellations!

But though, at the first glance, religion seems to be paradoxical from the logical point of view, it is, nevertheless, not at all illogical if we understand that it always tries to relate the individual phenomenon to the whole. Perhaps it can best be described as the attitude that drives man from the single toward that which is total. Religion is the longing for wholeness, for union of the isolated with the universality of being. Is it not significant that etymologically the words whole, holy, wholesome, all can be traced back to the old Anglo-Saxon root "hale," meaning both whole and healthy? Isolation, so people apparently have always felt, makes man sick; wholeness makes him sound.

But though we live in, or with, or on the whole, it is always greater than we are able to comprehend, for it surpasses the analytical power of the intellect. Though not illogical, one cannot penetrate it by the processes of deduction or induction. It can be apprehended only by the kind of intuition by virtue of which man can become the prophet, the artist, the creative inventor, but it has little to do with the concerns of a pedestrian mind.

These basic characteristics apply to all great world religions. Yet it does not therefore follow that the specific sacraments and cults which distinguish the great religions from each other are all together mere super-structure and unnecessary cargo, which, if dispensed with, would give us the international world religion in which all the specific creeds could and should be absorbed. Though the symbolisms and sacred rituals are not of the essence—many of them are even obsolete superstitions and should go overboard—they are nevertheless the vehicles by which man approaches the Eternal. As a Christian, I can—perhaps—understand the ideas of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Parsism and especially of Judaism; I can even worship in their temples and holy places. But with the best of intentions, I cannot really become a Buddhist or whatever I may feel inclined to become. The language in which we have been taught to pray and worship is part of our personality; somehow it goes with us just as does not having been taught to pray and worship. Of course there are profound conversions, but they are often connected with grave inner crises.

On the other hand, if we have been brought up in such a way that we believe it is only *our* language and only *our* prayer the

Lord may listen to, then we become incapable of seeing the community of all men who sense the Divine in their individual lives. Religious education sailing under such wind is regionalism, nationalism, and imperialism surreptitiously raised from the secular level, where it is bad enough, to the level of the transcendent, where it is worse. It is the divider, not the unifier of mankind. Such education is not religious, but irreligious, however big and pompous may be the external organization, the ritual and the phraseology. In our period when humanity must either come together or perish, we cannot afford such division.

To repeat, if the religious faith expressed in this essay is such that, despite differences of cult, all men can agree upon it, we would then be one step farther on the path toward civilization. But they will not agree. For there are too many who never having sensed the language of faith refuse to listen, or who having heard it from dogmatic parents and preachers either go around with closed minds until they die or, once the eyes have been opened to wider horizons, are unable to free themselves from intellectual protest against all that has to do with religion. For these indifferent, or dogmatic, or suspiciously hostile persons this article contains nonsense, or heresy, or both. In them the mental organ is damaged which renders a person capable of relating himself reverentially to the universe in its wholeness and to the various strivings of men who live in it.

Perhaps religion will ever have two foes, those who pride themselves on their exclusive possession of the Truth and those who pride themselves on their hostility or indifference in all matters religious. As always, here the extremes play into each other's hands. Let us hope that it will not be suffering but insight which enables an increasing number of people to recognize the indigenous and unifying power in all religion. Only thus will an education be possible which is deeply religious and at the same time free from schismatic parochialism. So far as we know, never has a culture survived that has severed itself from its original roots. We are today in this danger, for one of the roots of our culture is the Judaeo-Christian form of religion, which so many of us no longer understand.

However, the analogy between culture and physical growth and,

consequently, between cultural origin and the root of a plant, is misleading. The roots of a plant cannot be renewed. In contrast, the origin of a civilization is an idea or a set of ideas deeply grounded in basic human experience. Such generative ideas can ever again become part of man's inner life, provided he understands them not as a bundle of dead traditions, but as creative energies which can preserve themselves only by the continual test of action and by courageous exposure to the challenge of history.

Religion represents such an energy. It is in our hands whether we wish its wellspring to be clogged, or whether we wish to lead its refreshing waters into channels of modern life. We can, if we *will*, but whether we *all* will, or a sufficient number of us, no one can foresee.

III. THE MEANING AND TEACHING OF DEMOCRACY

No one doubts today that we live in a crisis not only in regard to our social, economic and political conditions, but also in regard to our ethical convictions. We no longer have a clear concept of man either in terms of a philosophical anthropology or in terms of a transcendent metaphysics. We may be able to describe, to a degree, how man behaves in a given situation, but we have become less and less capable of developing the creative attitude which not only accepts situations, but interprets, moulds, and changes them in the light of a great and far reaching ethical vision. With this vision lacking, our minds inevitably concentrate on what is here and now. Man, losing the goal, becomes busy with details. If the history of humanity teaches us anything, it is this. To be sure, the details also should be taken seriously (who does not do so remains a life long amateur), but they need the illumination given by the perspective of the ideal.

But many will reply we have a great ethical ideal on which our Western civilization and education is agreed—democracy.

No doubt, a profound value lies in the ideal of democracy, however often the term may be used for mere purposes of propaganda. We all must be grateful that the democratic ideal is the uniting factor in our schools, and, so we hope, also in our political life. But two great questions emerge.

First, is "democracy" a sufficiently strong tie, if it signifies noth-

ing but a form of political organization, or an ideological weapon in hot and cold wars? For there are many divergences with respect to its political and economic application. Hitler's minister of propaganda also spoke of democracy and many believed him. Communism too has included the term in its vocabulary.

Second, can the deepest aspirations contained in the concept of democracy, those for which we are willing to fight, be sufficiently explained and preserved by reference to a merely secular philosophy, or to a form of humanism that holds its concepts strictly within horizontal relationships between men and men and so denies the justification of metaphysics and religious transcendence?

It is the contention of this treatise that secular humanism—despite all its merits in directing modern man's attention toward a rational interpretation of his intellectual and social obligations—is as insufficient for a complete explanation of the democratic ideal and for the vital transmission of this ideal in our schools and various institutions which serve the training of teachers, as is an intolerant and sectarian interpretation of religion.

Our schools, so we contend, must and can teach democracy in a spirit which leads man toward an understanding of its transcendent dimension, or sooner or later democracy will lose the depth which has helped it to emerge and which alone can help it to survive.

The public schools of this country, in consequence of the necessary and praiseworthy principle of the separation of State and Church, cannot attempt to indoctrinate a specific creed, Christian or otherwise. Likewise most of our colleges and universities would reject such a demand. This, however, does not mean and has never been intended to mean, that there cannot be a religious spirit pervading our education, especially in our interpretation of democracy.

We will try to amplify this statement in the following paragraphs.

1. *The Democratic Sense of Freedom.* Democracy, in the ethical sense, feels itself to be the guardian of freedom. Of course, regard for freedom, at least to a degree, was already inherent in the civilizations of the Greeks and Romans; perhaps it existed even in the Middle Ages to a greater extent than we generally assume. For

in order to materialize his desire for freedom, man depends on the instruments available to him, and there were not too many in medieval times. Thus, if we look one-sidedly at the tangible result rather than on the motivation, we may easily misjudge our ancestors before the Renaissance. Nevertheless, freedom as a central motif of public discussion and action is a characteristic of modern or post-Renaissance culture.

When Galileo defends his cosmic theory, he consciously fights not only for the recognition of his own work, but for intellectual freedom. The term freedom occurs again and again in the writings of the French pre-revolutionary Encyclopedists and in the thought of the German idealists. The category of freedom is almost the only one on which the modern existentialists agree. But all this, one could say, is still philosophy. To have transferred the idea of freedom into political actuality is the merit of the American Revolution. Ideal, ideological, political, economic, social, and geographical factors worked together to make this country the symbol of democratic life.

But as in the history of every comprehensive ideal, there are strange paradoxes also in the development of political freedom. In this case the paradox lies in the relation of freedom to science. There is no doubt that science, often described as deterministic and quantitative, has contributed more to the material conditions of man's freedom than we usually recognize. But there may be something highly deceptive in the sense of physical independence which science has procured for us. A man whose airplane breaks down over the ocean may still be devoured by a shark, as were our forebears when they dared swim in dangerous waters. Nevertheless, a certain victory over the daily discomforts, the conquest of hunger, dirt, and cold, the defeat of time and space through modern inventions, a higher degree of health through modern medicine, gives man a feeling of mastery over the accidents of nature which our ancestors could not possess. It may be deceptive, but it has worked.

In a yet deeper sense science has liberated large parts of humanity. Together with philosophy it has helped to free man from magical feelings of fear and demonism. The fact that—unnecessarily from a truly religious point of view—theologians felt com-

elled to fight the scientists and consequently created martyrs, has but strengthened modern man's respect for science.

Both through its effects on our physical and on our mental life, science as a discipline has also contributed to man's sense of self-respect which is the twin brother to the sense of freedom. Thus, the scientific worker of today finds himself in a dilemma. On the one hand, he has to exclude the whole great world of human ethical motivations, for they only disturb the accuracy of his thought and operations. As a strict scientist, he is neither immoral, nor anti-moral, but morally neutral, or a-moral. If, on the other hand, he envisages the despair which the use of the physical power he has provided may cause to mankind, he must become one of the champions in the fight for man's ethical freedom and responsibility.

Theoretically, only a comprehensive and overarching philosophical integration can harmonize the two diverging aspects of scientific determinism and historical teleology. Practically, our greatest scientists become increasingly aware of their obligations to humanity. But along with the rest of us, they are in the position of Goethe's *Zauberlehrling* (The Magician's Apprentice) :

Die ich rief, die Geister,
Werd' ich nun nicht los.
(The spirits which I summoned,
How can I quiet them?)

For research will go its way. As one leading scientist said to me: "We cannot cut our brains out."

Here is one of our great conflicts. As indicated, in part it will have to be solved on the level of high theoretical abstraction. On the practical level we must hope that mankind, by dint of a union of nations animated not only by utilitarian considerations but by the strongest moral motives will turn science again into a blessing instead of into a cause of fear. Modern patriotism must no longer be confined to a single country; we must arrive at a level of historical development where loyalty to one's country and loyalty to the ideal of international solidarity are interdependent.

2. *The Sense of the Dynamic Quality of Life.* If someone would like to describe the essential difference between the mentality of

medieval and modern man he could state that the first had a static, whereas the second has a dynamic concept of life. For the medieval thinker, history centered in two great revelations, the secular coming from Aristotle, and the divine coming from Christ. The founder of Christianity made clear to man not only his personal nature and destiny, but also the beginning and the end of all history, the Creation and the Day of Judgment. All that man thought and did received its value or its condemnation from its nearness to or distance from the Divine Center.

For modern man, on the other hand, history is evolution. Whether he calls it revelation or not, he feels there is a chain of significant events that have made modern civilization possible, and he hopes that he is not at the end of the chain. Which of the many links in the chain he considers to be of the greatest import depends on the observer's point of view. For some Jews and Christians it may still be the Covenant, for the scientist it is perhaps the invention of the Arabic number system, for the soldier the invention of gunpowder. Optimistic societies believe that all these various occurrences interlace in a meaningful order. In other words, they believe in progress. When, in consequence of disappointing experiences, they lose faith in progress and at the same time repudiate recourse to a transcendental salvation, modern men find themselves in the situation aptly described by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and the contemporary existentialists as the situation of "anxiety," if not of despair.

However, no one completely escapes the mentality of his society even though he may live in protest against it. Thus the critic of modernity and its concept of progress is caught by the dynamic spirit of our times. Either he completely withdraws—which is no real answer—or he is bound to be excited by the rapid succession of ideas, styles, modes of living and inventions, social changes, wars, displacements of peoples, and the birth and death of nations. The final meaning of all this restlessness—how can he know it? Whether or not we humans want it, to a large degree the situation in which we live determines our purposes, as also it determines our future. If we do not want to die on the wayside, we have to share the experiences of our fellowmen, even if we would prefer to do something else.

This dynamic attitude toward life, at least for a few centuries, has made western man the master of the earth. He will transmit his seething energy to posterity even if other cultures wrest the symbols of leadership from his hand. It is this attitude for which he has been admired and imitated, but for which he also has been hated and despised by men imbued with the profound quiet of oriental wisdom.

Unless our culture is annihilated by its own means of destruction, there is no reason to believe that the desire for continual motion characteristic of Western man will change. But the more we are the driven and no longer the drivers, the greater is the danger that the forces of motion will lose direction and turn into a whirl of contradictory activities.

This danger cannot be prevented by just confessing our faith in progress, or by proudly showing our children the newest type of airplane. It may be the type that drops bombs into their lives and destinies. On the other hand, to tear down the hope for progress means to destroy the beacon that helps modern man orient himself on the wild waters of present day history.

What can be done?

First, we will have to tell ourselves and the younger generation that progress, as a total human achievement, can never be partial. Indeed, nothing fails like success in one part, at the expense of another significant aspect of human experiences. We may speak of making progress in theoretical knowledge, in engineering, in building a house or a road. But true historical progress is *total* progress, a continual integration of achievements of the mind, the heart and the hand. If one of the three lags behind, the mind may be used for sophistry, the heart for sentimentality, and the hand for stealing.

In earlier times, religion at its best gave man a set of beliefs which appealed to his whole personality. Even the faith in progress, or in the Kingdom of Man, is in its origin but a secular version of the religious idea of the Kingdom of God. Today, the American's belief in progress still has the overtone of universality. He thinks of a better future for humanity as a whole, and not merely of his own personal success.

But if this faith becomes more and more depleted of its deeper inspiration, if it becomes just a desire for comfortable living, then a new depression and international conflict may plunge us into a sea of disenchantment and despair. Can we always rely on a victorious war and a boom to fish us out? Anyhow, are these the means of salvation on which man should rely?

Second, we will have to discourage the naïvete in the assumption that progress follows automatically from the accumulative flow of experiences. This doctrine, though it is a bad popularization of anti-metaphysical pragmatism, has nevertheless as its motive an unconscious metaphysical conviction about ultimate reality, namely a faith in the essential goodness of nature and man. One is reminded of Whitehead's statement that if you refuse to have any metaphysics, you are bound to end in a very bad one.

We can become realistic only if we learn to see that man is neither innately good as is taught by optimistic modern thought, nor innately bad as was taught by misunderstood Christianity. Nor is he simply a "product of his environment" or a "bundle of reactions to outside stimuli." This is both bad psychology and naïve metaphysics. Man is a complicated mixture of hereditary and acquired traits which, of course, are in constant interaction with the environment. At the same time, man is constantly moulded and modified by his urges, emotions and his discriminating qualities which play their role in his freedom to decide; man is more than a bundle of reflexes—he is rational and moral as well. The reactions of various people to one and the same challenge are not necessarily similar; they may be totally different. One group may turn it into a source of love and encouragement, while another group may treat it as an excuse for hatred and self-pity; one group may transform a wilderness or a desert into a community, another succumb in the same situation to misery and starvation.

To be sure, man's freedom has only a certain degree of latitude in the presence of physical power. Before a stream of lava even the freest men are not free. Yet, the realization and utilization of the latitude of freedom which may be still available even under adverse circumstances, is the most important factor in human history. On it depends liberty or slavery, progress or decay, a life of hope or a life of anguish. In other words, to a large degree progress is a

decision of the spirit, or a result of the conviction that man fights on the side of God and not on the side of the devil.

If we tell our students indiscriminately that this country is the land of progress and freedom in which they have the right to participate just because they have their feet on American soil, we commit the same sin of which we are guilty when we assure them that this is the land of security. Progress, freedom, and security are accomplishments and not gifts from nature. Those who take them for granted will lose them.

3. *Truth and Order.* The German philosopher and poet, Lessing, coined the oft-quoted statement: "If God held before my eyes a balance with Truth on the one and Search on the other scale, I would choose the latter."

This dynamic concept of truth does not express a predilection for a relativistic play of ideas or the self-enjoyment of the intellect as an end in itself. It denotes the Protestant liberal preference for the situation of spiritual freedom rather than the situation of the Truth invested in a supposedly divine institution. It signifies the hope that man may acquire deeper insights into the essence of life through participation in its surging creativeness than through placing himself in a situation of stability. In the complete shelter of the Ultimate, man would lose his freedom, and so himself.

The Protestant idea of freedom from which, at least in part, the modern notion of democracy has arisen, symbolizes not only a vague and aimless groping within a constantly changing universe, but man's chance and challenge within a world with an inner meaning to which he can relate his search. Thus we discover within freedom its complement: the idea of an Order, or Cosmos, or Logos, which gives man's groping a self-transcending and universal meaning, a meaning which is both rational and ethical. According to this belief the *summum verum* and the *summum bonum*, the highest truth and the highest virtue, are the same. Man, who is actively longing for the *verum*, comes close also to the *bonum*, because he experiences the laws of creation inherent in daily life.

It is this beautiful inner polarity of freedom which gives rationality and dignity to the plurality of our endeavors, though final truth and perfection will always be beyond our reach. Through this dialectic between freedom on the one hand and truth, moral dis-

cipline and law on the other, we human beings can live a life in which analytic weighing can lead to decision, where there is responsibility and imputability despite sin and error, where loyalty balances criticism, and peace of mind does not suffer from any slight disappointment.

There is, of course, a profound ontological problem behind and within this faith. Since freedom represents the possibility of change, whereas truth represents continuity, the question arises: how can there be change within continuity, variety within unity, and the continual flux of experiences within the identity of the human person? Or, to go one step farther: how can there be change, variety, and flux of experiences without resultant chaos?

Here again, the answer can be given only if we assume an ordering Logos behind all transient phenomena, something that reminds us of reason, form, structure, law, and meaningful continuity. Full insight into its essence and content is beyond the narrow scope of the human mind; in weak symbols only can we apprehend the Infinite. Indeed, prevent man from the continual revival and interpretation of these symbols, and you deprive him of life's most sublime meaning. If his mind is sufficiently dulled, he may contentedly tread on the road of habit and conventionality, but such an attitude is of no avail in times of crisis.

It has often been stated that human truth is only a lesser error. This is true. But it is not to say that the story of human search is "nothing but" error. Lesser error is also growing truth, and more truth, being a step toward the laws of reality, encourages man to adjust his conduct more adequately to the inner dynamic of reality. Here lies the deepest impetus for man's untiring quest for verity. It issues from his deep-seated feeling that the more he reasons the greater is his expectancy to overcome the threat of blind accident, i.e., the greater is his chance to survive.* The category of truth and the category of survival, in the most comprehensive psycho-physical sense, are akin.

4. *Love and Tolerance.* As we have already indicated with reference to the relationship between truth and virtue, the origin and

* I have dealt with this and similar problems more extensively in my book *Conditions of Civilized Living*, E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1946, and in The Hazen Foundation Pamphlet, *Man and Reality*, 1948.

essence of values is probably one and the same, whatever names we may give them. Freedom, or man's capacity of weighing and choosing, would be meaningless unless it could unfold itself in an Order or a Logos. Within the compass of his understanding this Order reveals itself to man and thus makes it possible for him to direct his choice according to rational principles.

Yet: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and angels and have not charity I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." This verse from the 13th Chapter of I Corinthians, is not only a demand for "charity." It says that all power of the intellect and all earthly might may lead man away from the Lord rather than toward Him unless they are propelled by the most creative of all human motives, Love.

According to the Christian tradition, I Corinthians 13 has to be understood in connection with the various statements of the Bible that all men are brethren through their being the children of God. There is mutual respect in human brotherhood, because we know that the most precious qualities we feel in ourselves, are also in our neighbors. Human brotherhood also demands tolerance, because we should feel the imperfection of our neighbor all the more painfully in ourselves. But all these virtues are but derivations from the primary virtue of love, which in turn springs from the embracing consciousness that all individual life is participation in the wonder of the divine Creation. Thus Christian love is essentially reverence, the will to help as much as possible in the mysterious unfolding of creative living.

There seems to be a paradoxical mixture of feelings in this brotherly attitude of love; on the one hand we experience dignity, on the other hand we feel humble. Our sense of dignity springs from the realization that our minds allow us to look into, and to unite ourselves with, a world far beyond our physical existence; our sense of humility results from our consciousness that all that makes us human, in the deepest meaning of that word, is not our merit, but the gift of participating in creative growth.

But there should be no false sentimentality in these feelings of love, respect, and tolerance. Those who use freedom without obligation to the Logos which gives it meaning and direction, those who try to use their fellowmen's love and tolerance in order to suppress

the freedom and dignity of the human person, should ask neither love, nor tolerance for their actions. Neither love nor tolerance should open the gates to the arena in which they might be slaughtered.

Yet, there is in freedom, truth, and love, the attitude of infinite understanding even for the aberrations of a person. The potential humanity in him, however deeply hidden, will be respected. Therefore the law of civilized nations protects even the criminal and condemns intolerance, which is blind, destructive and hateful as a shame to mankind. But, to repeat, the rejection of intolerance does not prevent man from assuming the attitude of militant self-defense and fighting tolerance if he sees the foundations of freedom, truth, love and mutual understanding threatened by men without sense for these values. Christ forgave sinners of all kind, but he inveighed against the Pharisees and chastised the usurers who used the Lord's temple for cheating their fellowmen.

5. *The Value of the Individual.* With the remark that in the best of the Western tradition even love and tolerance can become militant, but that blind intolerance against the human person as such is a sign of barbarism, we have already touched upon one of the basic principles of our Western tradition, the appreciation of the individual. For how could all the values that we have recognized be possible without this appreciation? Collectives as such—guilds, corporations, associations, states and international alliances—are requisite to human development. But just as they can help, so can they also hamper it, for they can easily become the vessels and instruments of self-seeking power. The final moral responsibility always rests in the human person.

This fact, however, is no excuse for the reckless individualism, actually motivated by greed for power and success, which thrives in Western culture under the name of freedom. What else but ruthless competition can develop in a dynamic society where freedom is so often misunderstood as absence from restraint?

The counterattack against this attitude of *laissez-faire* for the privilege, without the *laissez-aller* for the less fortunate fellowman, was bound to come. Unfortunately, it came at a time when the Christian churches had allied themselves more intimately with the powerful than with the poor, and had dismally failed to recognize

the Christian's social responsibilities. Consequently the opposition against the injustice of society often included hostility to any kind of religion, organized or unorganized. This opposition acquired its greatest strength in that form of Marxism which now, in the distorted form of Russian Communism, has become the main threat to the Western form of democracy.

Thus there are two central problems on the solution of which depends the survival of Western Civilization. Will the followers of Marx recognize that their prophet's revolutionary protest against degenerate social relations sprang, at least in part, from the deepest motives of the Judaeo-Christian tradition with its emphasis on personal freedom and the value of the individual? Marx's concept of, and violent protest against, "exploitation" is not merely an economic and technical protest, it is a moral protest rooted in an essentially religious-idealist interpretation of man.

Second, will those who profess to defend the basic values of the Christian Western tradition against present pseudo-Marxist totalitarianism recognize that this heresy would not have sprung up and continued to grow, had there not been a shameful discrepancy between the true ethics of Christianity and the actual behavior of the so-called Christian peoples and their churches? No realistic thinker will deny the impact of our forms of production and distribution of goods on our daily lives. Hence, he will not recommend an arbitrary change or modification of these forms under the pressure of doctrinaire opinions. However, the final measure of social and economic organizations will always lie in the degree to which they help in the unfolding and realization of the inner values of man, his freedom, his progress, his search for truth, his love, and his personality. If liberal-capitalist democracy cannot stand this test, arms and police forces will not be able to save it.

Of course, it is extremely difficult to change even small details in a social structure which has lost the moral fervor of its original architects. On the other hand, if this fervor is still vital, then man will be able to make even great changes without endangering the moral nature of his society; indeed, only in this way will he be able to preserve it.

Somehow a synthesis will have to be found between the individualist and the socialist trends in the modern world. Not only because it is a threat and waste of energy to live in a "divided world,"

but also because the strength of each nation depends on its capacity to combine individual freedom, which in isolation easily turns into egotism, with the cooperative spirit of brotherly love.

IV. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THOSE WHO PREPARE TEACHERS

In the last part of this essay we may now inquire about responsibilities of the teacher, not merely as a disciplinarian and expositor of subject matter, but as an educator, acting as a trustee of the best inherent in our Western-Christian society.

1. There are certain trends in our modern intellectual world to which the teacher should not fall prey. Instead of being an admirer and imitator of "scientism," he should be its critic from a total human as well as from a truly scientific point of view. For "scientism" is a distortion of science. Needless to say, the teacher should utilize objective and scientific approaches to education such as psychometrics, statistics and experimental psychology, but the use of quantitative methods for the better understanding and evaluation of certain functions and achievements of man does not imply a merely quantitative and materialistic interpretation of man's total nature. The prime obligation of the teacher is to help young people to mature, i.e., to develop intellectually, emotionally and practically into creative and harmonious beings. For this purpose science is important, but it is not all.

2. He should resist a certain tendency on the part of learned, but essentially half-educated men, to destroy faith in permanent values by displaying their capacity for relativizing everything and anything. This technique can be learned by very crude and simple minds, which is probably why it has had so much attraction. The art of comprehensive thinking is much more difficult. Comprehensive thinking, to be sure, does not spring from an uncritical attitude; on the contrary, it cannot exist without critical power. But it realizes the deeper order within the phenomena of life; it realizes that without such a deeper order even critical thinking, in the systematic and constructive sense, would be impossible. Disciplined thought, even if—or just because—it is cruel to beloved errors, seeks and reflects the universal Logos; bad thought reflects human partiality.

3. The good teacher should understand that knowledge of psychological methods and of subject matter, though necessary, remains barren and can even become misleading without the

inspiration that fills the singularity of facts and events with motive and meaning. Not that the teacher should consider himself a dogmatic preacher—what could be worse? Yet, he should open the windows of a young and waiting soul for the great wonders of life, of which freedom, the possibility of progress and truth, the urge to love and the dignity of the individual are perhaps the greatest.

4. Nobody can inspire who does not have deep convictions. They are the results, but also the feeders of the spirit. About their basic contents we have spoken in the third part of this essay, explaining the meaning of democracy for our schools, as well as the spirit in which democracy should be taught. The moment such convictions become fixed and frozen, they become their own enemies. A lecturer is much more impressive if he is not a "lecturer" in the sense of one who slavishly "reads" his prepared notes, but if, even at the risk of deviations and repetitions, he allows his listeners to participate in the struggle of creation. So also is that teacher a better guide who does not give his students the feeling that he knows all the answers, but that he has engaged in continual search and self-examination. To be ashamed of his ignorance is the sign of a dead soul. A man with such a soul radiates nothing but boredom; even the right things he says are merely correct—and mere correctness can be awfully dull for a lively young person who is trying to understand and experience the great adventure of life.

5. Much of what has been written on the training of teachers is of little avail because of a lack of realization of the difficulties with which a public secondary school system is confronted. We have in our school system about seven million youth and about three hundred thousand teachers. There are taught young people with extremes of ability (from I.Q.'s which make learning almost impossible up to 140 and higher). Many of them are in school unwillingly. They have to be prepared for all kinds of vocations and professions by teachers from the most varying cultural backgrounds with highly diverse talents and interest. Often these teachers are poorly paid and must work in badly equipped buildings. In addition, many women use school work only as a transition from college to marriage.

However, certain generalities might be ventured. Our typical state teachers' colleges, just as many of our liberal arts colleges, are places where the idyllic isolation of the students from practical re-

sponsibilities (a hundred years ago youth of the same age level extended our frontier to the west) as well as the isolation from the broad streams of cultural life tends to create a dangerous state of aloofness. It is difficult in such an atmosphere to help the prospective teacher understand the deeper problems of civilization and appreciate fully the interests of our youth and their parents.

But here we already are at the frontier between the ideal and the actual. It is doubtful whether we will have a sufficient number of educators to carry through a revolution in our training of teachers and, even if they exist, whether they will have sufficient support on the part of the authorities and the taxpayers on which these authorities finally depend. Yet, even under the present conditions certain improvements might be possible. As a matter of fact, at several places they are already underway.

We need in our undergraduate and graduate preparation of teachers, both in our state teachers' colleges and in our liberal arts institutions, a better apportionment of the courses in general or liberal education in comparison with all the isolated courses in methods of teaching and psychology. Yet even here a word of caution is necessary. A large number of our teachers in secondary schools now come from liberal arts colleges; so do the large majority of students who enter the graduate schools of education in our leading universities. These graduate schools generally provide not more than one to two years for the training of advanced teachers, research workers and administrators in our public school system. By necessity, these graduate schools have to be "technical" to a degree, just as advanced business schools or schools of technology. For the broad liberal foundation of learning the graduate schools have to rely on the previous work of the professors in the undergraduate departments, many of whom are so apt to cast their criticism on the public school teachers and their training. If one examines this problem objectively one often discovers, even with students coming with good grades from good institutions, such an amazing lack of a truly liberal and inspiring undergraduate training that one might ask what the students and their professors have done with the four years they have had available, in comparison with the one year generally available for the graduate year in education.

In other words, the problem of the education of teachers is not just one of "teacher training" but at the same time one of liberal

or general education, the joint responsibility of the liberal arts institutions and, needless to say, of our high schools also.

6. The reader might expect in this treatise a more detailed treatment of the relationship between our public schools and our various institutions for the training of teachers on the one hand, and religious institutions on the other. As has already been said, this is a country in which the majority of citizens believe in the separation of State and Church, and they have good reasons to do so. However, the educational scene is now replete with discussions concerning the inclusion of religious instruction in the regular school period, the problem of denominational schools, and the problem of support of religious education by public taxation.

This is not the place for the discussion of these issues, but one of the many crucial factors may be mentioned. If all who participate in the strife of parties and opinions about religious instruction were really interested in religion and not to the same, and even to a higher, degree in politics and competition, the problem would not be as difficult as it is. But, unfortunately, there is this mingling of concerns. Even if it were not of intentional character—and certainly there are many men and women with nothing but a pure interest in the religious tradition—the political consequences issuing from a modification in the relation between school and religious denominations would impress itself upon the people. For any deeper change in the spiritual life of a nation affects by necessity also its political life. Religion is not an abstract matter of learning—as ecclesiastical history may be for some university professors—rather it is “a way of life” in the most comprehensive sense of the word. It is, consequently, inevitable that through the whole history of humanity religion and politics reacted upon each other. Religion sought the help of politics, and politics the help of religion. But politics alone never could vitalize a religion that had lost its genuine vitality, just as inadequate political organizations could not survive for more than a brief time by calling religion to their succor. It is the spirit that matters; “the wind bloweth where it listeth.”

Here is, therefore, the central problem of the American school, its teacher education, and to a degree, of American democracy as a whole:—

In the strife of nations this republic may still be successful because of its superior physical strength—or it may not. If among

American teachers and families there is a fading away of transcendental convictions, if democracy and democratic education are conceived of in a narrow political sense, or in the manner of a merely relativist and experimental philosophy, then our republic will become but one of the several forms of organization by which men have tried and will try to order and police their societies. But certainly it will then no longer be looked upon by freedom-loving men as a source of inspiration, as a country of refuge from persecution. But if the teachers and parents of this country are still willing—and able—to convey to the younger generation its basic political and cultural concept, that of democracy, as an attempt of man to reflect in his individual and communal life the verities he discovers through the free use of his reason guided by a religious conscience, then the American culture will reflect its religious motivation and continue to make an ever-growing contribution to human culture. The choice is still before us.

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